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Peace and Nuclear-free Advocacy Revisited: Lessons from New Zealand and Implications for Japan

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Abstract

Although there are multiple pathways of conditions leading to desired policy outcomes, the viability of peace and nuclear-free advocacy can be related to the convergence of a strong, diverse, and active civil society, where leadership and a responsive political environment are well-integrated. We discuss that sociopolitical mobilizations (e.g. peace and nuclear-free advocacy), active civil society, and democratic institutions are not only linked to each other but are also co-existent. In this essay, we look at the case of New Zealand (Aotearoa) with its unique nuclear-free peace movement and find some implications for contemporary Japan, which is the only country which was subjected to atomic bombing but which does not support nuclear disarmament in its official policies, despite the presence of a long-standing peace movement and substantial majorities in favor of steps like Japan signing the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

Keywords: nuclear, peace, advocacy, New Zealand, Japan, TPNW

I. Introduction

Since the 1980s, New Zealand has played a successful role in the global nuclear debate by achieving a nuclear-free policy goal. When considering the bigger picture, the claim could be made that New Zealand's political and social movements in the contemporary era were influenced by several major events and incidents including the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, New Zealand's involvement in the Korean War and, later, the Vietnam War, their security agreement with the U.S. (called ANZUS), the continuation of French nuclear testing in the Pacific, the visits of U.S. nuclear-capable warships, the bombing of the Greenpeace ship (*The Rainbow Warrior*) by the French foreign intelligence service The General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), and others. These events contributed to the sociopolitical mobilization throughout the country, which in turn led to a nuclear-free status. In past research, we argued that civil society mobilization in New Zealand, with a strong anti-

nuclear identity, produced important results, and there are two important driving factors behind the policy achievement: persistent civil society favoring pacifism and inclusive democracy and governance [1].

In this essay, we argue that civil society and political parties aligned with sociopolitical mobilizations are important elements to achieve the goals for a sociopolitical change. We also try to see what lessons from New Zealand can be drawn for Japan, which is not willing to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), despite the presence of a long-standing peace movement. Our aim is to fill the gap existing between pro-nuclear disarmament advocacy carried out by civil society and the positions adopted by pro-nuclear states.

Importantly, we want to emphasize that our intention is not to compare both countries, as we are aware of cross-country and sociocultural differences and positionalities in international political life and defense policies. Instead, we are interested in what lessons we can draw from New Zealand's experience. Also, we do not differentiate "mobilization" from "movement," even though we assert that movements provide a much more comprehensive understanding in terms of approaches and strategies of actors involved. In a similar vein, "effectiveness" in this essay is used interchangeably with "success," which is defined as achieving the desired policy outcome of sociopolitical mobilizations.

In social movement literature, the scholars who researched "resource mobilization" discuss how resources (material, human, social-organizational, cultural, and moral ones) are significant elements for the surge and rise of any mobilization affecting the achievement of desired outcomes [2–7]. Also, the proponents of the "political opportunities" theory considered social movements as a window of opportunity providing encouragement while carrying out their activities during the mobilization [8–13].

The case of New Zealand has proven that the sole explanation of resource analysis would not be sufficient to understand any desired policy achievements led by civic actors. The bottom-up engagement of civil society and the democratic and open nature of the state leading the peace and nuclear-free mobilization to become a "nuclear-free zone" are equally important. In other words, thanks to the domestic sociopolitical structure, the movement members can have an opportunity to focus on a contested issue, take an action accordingly (such as creating social pressure), and ally with supportive parties [14]. Therefore, this essay considers not only to the dynamics of civil society masterminding the mobilization but also the openness of the state to communicating and partnering with the civil society actors.

II. The Case of New Zealand

Despite the early nuclear-science-centered enthusiasm following the Manhattan Project, New Zealand created an initial nuclear-free ethos due to several incidents that led many ordinary citizens to unify over the course of time. The U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 was a crucial event for the initial stage of unification and mobilization in New Zealand as it sparked empathy and solidarity, as well as outrage. As a result of this, as well as the Korean and Vietnam Wars, a small, nuclear-free peace movement with a largely moral approach developed in New Zealand between the 1960s and 1980s. This then evolved to a widespread and powerful force in domestic politics focused on practical questions, such as French nuclear testing in the Pacific in the 1960s, and later, the visits of American nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered U.S. ships. One of the strongest arguments for peace and nuclear-free mobilization was independence from the ANZUS treaty, which was based on the shared security interests since the 1950s [15]. According to the Treaty, U.S. ships and aircraft had a right to enter New Zealand's territory because the U.S. is one of the members of the ANZUS. The treaty was not welcomed by New Zealanders, who wanted to be autonomous with no ties to the U.S. [16].

The diverse elements of peace and nuclear-free advocacy in New Zealand between the 1960s and 1980s were based on the implementation and continuation of mass demonstrations, rallying, campaigns,

petitions, press statements, lobbying, educational tools, and expert involvement, among other things. These became mainstream tactics in a non-violent manner and were organized by the heterogeneous groups, associations, committees, and individual participants. Some of the active groups included the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament New Zealand, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Peace Squadron, Greenpeace, The Peace Media, New Zealand Nuclear Free Peacemakers, Peace Council, Quakers, Peace Movement Aotearoa, the Disarmament and Security Centre, Women for Peace, Maori Women's Welfare League, and Progressive Youth Movement [14].

Although there were several challenges during these mobilizations, such as France's continuous nuclear testing in the Pacific in the 1960s and the visits of U.S. ships, the political goal was clearly defined and prioritized by civil society. The actions toward nuclear tensions were formulated, solidified, disseminated, justified, and backed in both a collective and decentralized manner by heterogeneous civic actors including pacifist grassroots groups, the Māori, scientists, intellectuals, students, churches, environmentalists, and others¹. Women played prominent leadership roles in disarmament activities via committee creation, petition preparation, and network contact activity required for effective campaigning [17]. While mobilizing between the 1960s and 1980s, New Zealanders voluntarily created specific campaigns, lobbied the members of parliament to declare the Nuclear Free Zones Campaign, used media toolkits and channels intending to convey unity in diversity, and invited authoritative overseas experts [18].

These events and incidents created a nationwide counter-nuclear stance in which overwhelming public opinion and the Labor Party worked together on a sole and unconditional mission: the creation of a nuclear-free zone. When the majority of people were persistent on nuclear issues, the Labor Party benefited from it and campaigned against nuclear weapons in collaboration with civil society. The Labor Party was not only sensitive to public preferences but also responsive to mass mobilization. The Labor Party was strategic, putting the nuclear issue at the center of their party agenda in their electoral politics. Upon the Labor Party's victory in the 1984 snap election, the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act was successfully passed [19]. Following the nuclear-free law, the U.S. suspended New Zealand from the ANZUS security agreement, which led the country to become more independent in its foreign policy [16].

Consequently, in the late 1980s, Japan, as a U.S. ally, distanced itself from New Zealand's nuclear-free approach and policies and had excluded New Zealand representatives in Tokyo from strategic and security discussions related to the Pacific [20]. Additionally, New Zealand's legislative decision led New Zealand and Japan to limit prime ministerial visits in the 1980s and 1990s [21].

What makes New Zealand unique from its counterparts in history is the creation and maintenance of the peaceful and nuclear-free identity as a symbol of New Zealand's values. Since the 1980s, New Zealanders have been proud of their recent history and national identity that is based on a nuclear-free consensus in nuclear policy-making. Successive governments from various parts of the political spectrum have maintained their support for these policies, ensuring they have endured since then [22]. Not only at home, but also globally, the nation has continuously contributed and committed to the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. The peace and nuclear-free advocacy and activities by their civil society actors have never stopped, as we see in their promotion of the TPNW, while the New Zealand government has asserted an official leadership role in support of the treaty. Non-governmental experts and advocates

¹ For example, the members of the well-known campaign, Peace Squadron, confronted and blockaded the visiting nuclear warship. They presented radical acts of protest such as civil disobedience. They also produced media attention and generated public interest with a focus on stopping nuclear ship visits. Another well-known example is the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament New Zealand. The members reached the government by fax, open letters, and petitions, and were involved in extensive lobbying with the New Zealand government while sustaining organizational activities by donations [14].

played a leading role in the treaty negotiations through providing working papers, interventions, and international petitions and letters. The country is also actively following up the implementation process of the treaty [23].

III. The Case of Japan

Many people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been active in mobilizations for peace since the tragic events of 1945. In the past decades, they have striven for a non-nuclearized future as well as disarmament with a powerful message: “No more Hiroshimas.” In particular, atomic bomb survivors (*hibakusha*) were mobilized by several means, including (but not limited to) campaigning against nuclear weapons, petitioning for their abolishment, collecting millions of signatures, holding international conferences on the anniversaries of the bombings, sharing victims’ experiences continuously, creating an avenue for peaceful dialogue, using the artistic expressions of their demand, disseminating information about the dangers of nuclear weaponry through media outlets, etc. They have created a powerful “ban-the-bomb” movement (a peace and nuclear-free movement), for which they have received significant attention in and outside of Japan. Organizational drivers of this mobilization emerged and have grown over time, including the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyoku), Nihon Hidankyo (a national organization of atomic bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and Mayors for Peace. This active and vocal mobilization has not convinced the Japanese government to be independent in its nuclear-weapons-related decisions [24].

Japan has been a member of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1976 and does not have its own nuclear weapons. However, official foreign policy is based on adherence to nuclear deterrence. Japan was absent from the TPNW, which aims to eliminate nuclear weapons through a legally-binding international agreement and delegitimizes nuclear deterrence². According to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the nuclear-weapon states and all nuclear umbrella states, including NATO members and U.S. allies, did not participate in the negotiations in 2017, except the Netherlands, which is the only state to vote against the adoption of the TPNW [26]. The question then arises: why has Japan taken a neutral stance toward the Treaty after suffering massively from radiation following the 1945 atomic bombs? Since post-war Japan bases its own non-nuclear weapons policy on the 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles (Hikaku San Gensoku), requiring the non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction of any nuclear weapons, why is there such reluctance to play a leading role in the global nuclear debate, especially after experiencing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons as well as the mobilization of peace and nuclear-free advocates?

We assert that there are several factors for Japan’s passive role, unwillingness to participate in the negotiations, and refusal to be a signatory of the TPNW, notwithstanding the domestic commitment to pacifism. First, it is related to the longstanding and ongoing security alliance and defense cooperation with the U.S., as well as U.S. pressure (Japan abstains as nuclear arms ban treaty talks signed at UN 2017). It is in fact rooted in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (ANPO), which is based on the commitment of the two nations to defend each other. Second, it is related to the threats and missiles from nuclear-armed North Korea (and also North Korea’s nuclear weapon development efforts). Japan’s geopolitical position (surrounded by North Korea, China, and Russia) makes Japan dependent upon the U.S. vis-à-vis a nuclearized Northeast Asia [27]. Japan has always been caught between the reality of nuclear threat and the hopes of civil society.

² For this, the Japanese Ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament stated that “Regrettably, given the present circumstances, we must say that it would be difficult for Japan to participate in this Conference in a constructive manner and in good faith, believing that the NK threats and provocative actions would not be resolved through a nuclear ban treaty” [25].

The sub-factors are basically sociohistorical. Japan has an advanced democracy with a vibrant culture of community-based grassroots civil society mobilization (*shimin undou*) established in the 1960s and 1970s due to environmental degradation, which accompanied the country's rapid industrialization, and its effects on the lives of the people [28]. Additionally, labor union protests in the 1950s, ANPO demonstrations for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 1968–1969 Japanese university protests by the New Left student organizations, and middle-class women's movements were significant elements in expanding a stratum of socio-politically interested and active citizens. This is also similar in the case of nuclear energy-related mobilization. The actors in the nuclear energy-free mobilization before the 2011 Fukushima accident have three social layers: residents in areas designated for nuclear power plant construction (particularly farmers and fishers); students, workers, and middle class housewives based in the cities mobilizing following the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident due to the imported food being contaminated with radioactive materials and concerns about the risks to their infants; and the urban intellectuals promoting renewable energy alternatives [29].

However, the impact of citizens' involvement did not create nationwide mobilization and remained local because sociopolitical issues on the national level were dominated by industrial interests [30]. Civil society groups and organizations were typically small with limited budgets, membership, and professional staff, and with small geographic scopes because of centralized policy structure, strong bureaucratic government, and strict regulations, accompanied by lack of recognition and funding [31].

Community members in rural areas were financially supported by the pro-nuclear Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Organized labor unions became discouraged in fighting against contested issues. Young people also became uninterested in politics over time as they sought to secure stable jobs in companies. "Citizenship" education for the younger generation was not (and still is not) prevalent. Mass media has also controlled the voices of civil society actors on sociopolitical issues and made the populace invisible [29]. Additionally, Japanese people value peace, calm, and harmony and avoid direct conflict with political authorities in any circumstances. These factors resulted in a decline in the political participation of the Japanese citizens, leading to less interest and fewer commitments from the 1970s to 1990s [30]. In the past few decades, the situation has remained similar. Surprisingly, following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, LDP received an electoral victory in 2012, an election which saw the lowest voter turnout (59%) in post-war Japanese history [32].

In addition, the "carrot and stick" approach (*ame to muchi*) that is based on reward and punishment by Japanese governmental representatives and policy elites (*seifu daihyousha*) does not provide the public with sufficient freedom to discuss sociopolitical issues openly. And, this policy approach leads to a perpetual control system. Due to the hierarchical structure in almost every sphere of society (from micro- to macro-policy-making), the established institutions are very strong where insulated and centralized policy-making is taking place. It does not allow the Japanese to reflect and engage critically in sociopolitical issues. These mobilizations remained somewhat elusive due to the increasing power of Japan's conservative and legislatively-dominant political party, with its "friendly authoritarianism" [33].

Taken all together, citizens of Japan became less participative in politics and more pessimistic about democratic freedom, with low expectations and trust in government as well as traditional political institutions [34]. The nuclear-free struggle of peace activists and A-bomb victims against nuclear orthodoxy has been isolated and remains local, solely based in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, except in their collaboration with their international counterparts over the decades. This isolation (*kakuri*) also never allows the peace and nuclear-free political parties to form a nationwide powerful coalition.

IV. Civil Society on Contested Issues

As a general term, “civil society” is considered an organized sociopolitical life that is independent from the state. It is based on volunteering and the self-generation, and largely self-supporting of groups [35]. It includes non-governmental bodies and organizations that political scientists consider interest or advocacy groups. The concept of “civil society” is highly dependent on the characteristics of each society; therefore, each society can redefine it differently, depending upon the particular issue that concerns them. Civil society participants take action mainly on a particular, contested issue that concerns the broader part of the society. Issue-oriented civil society actors consider a single concern or essential problem that affects them on a larger scale and try to bring about societal change. This issue can be peace or anti-nuclear oriented, depending upon what concerns the larger part of the society. By pointing to a specific issue, they can reduce the challenges of contestation by signaling their solidarity, providing logistical assistance, mobilizing experts, guiding, and pressuring their opponents to tackle the issue. In social mobilization, the typical form of conventional action is based on making their voices heard and getting their demands met. With their experience and expertise, civil society actors can also be helpful in identifying sociopolitical issues and creating a window of opportunity for sociopolitical advocacy. They can also help victims identify the issue and capture public and political attention through a common interest and goal [36].

The concept of civil society mobilizing for sociopolitical contested issues (a.k.a. social movements) has been largely discussed in literature since the 1960s. Social movement is defined by Della Porta and Diani as a “distinct social process, consisting of the mechanisms through which actors are engaged in collective action” [37]. According to them, people, or mobilized actors, are involved in social movements for many issues including nuclear nonproliferation, environmentalism, and more. They engage in social, political, and/or cultural conflicts to promote or oppose certain forms of social change. They realize it through motivated informal networks in pursuit of a common interest and goal and develop social identities through advocacy channels [37].

V. Discussion

As we are cognizant of the differences (timing, political and cultural status quo, diplomatic approaches, etc.), we intend to see how New Zealand played a role in the nuclear issue in terms of prevention and abolition of nuclear war following the Hiroshima and Nagasaki experiences, and where the case of Japan is situated when considering the big picture. Of course, we should not underestimate the structural factors and conditions that facilitated the process in the case of New Zealand, such as its small size and remote island position in the Southwest Pacific, as well as a population of less than 2.5 million people in the 1960s. This made it easy to connect and synergistically interact with government representatives and political elites. It is also a pluralistic and multi-cultural society, where the values of inclusion and a commitment to peace and justice were fundamental in every sphere of the society.

However, their efforts toward de-nuclearization were based on somewhat hypothetical fear toward the potential effects of nuclear weapons, whereas Japan’s effort has been based on rationalized and legitimized fear³ after the catastrophic experiences in 1945 (and also the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident). New Zealand has never experienced atomic bombing but always challenged the legality of nuclear weapons use and even compiled complaints to the International Court of Justice [38].

³ Here, we intend to emphasize that Japan experienced atomic bombing, and the survivors have supported their claims with its tragic impacts on their health, psychology, and emotions. Our intention for “hypothetical fear” is related to how New Zealand perceived and interpreted a nuclear threat with its potential impacts.

Furthermore, the overarching concern was not only the harmful effects of nuclear weapons on human health and the environment, but also the threat between major powers during the Cold War era, leading to increased antipathy toward nuclear weapons globally. Especially during the late phase of the Cold War, from 1979-1985, the threat of nuclear war was elevated globally. Therefore, global anti-nuclear weapons activism emerged and expanded⁴. At the same time, Japan, under American strategic planning and protection throughout the Cold War, oriented national interests toward post-war economic reconstruction and management, and thus played a passive role in foreign policy and global politics, especially in the 1980s [39].

Japan has maintained nuclear deterrence while emphasizing its efforts toward disarmament. Japan has a very clear position, as briefly mentioned (i.e. the three principles of not possessing, producing, or allowing the entry of nuclear weapons into the country), which is in line with New Zealand's defense policy. However, there is still something missing in the wider debate, which seems to be Japan's vigorous opposition and responsibility, which is needed to be put forward more in the policy debate. It is also contradictory that the U.S. stored nuclear weapons on Okinawa, which hosted the largest and most active U.S. Air Force base in East Asia during the Cold War [40]. For every country, the national security context is different. Thus, we should not underestimate the complications that occurred when considering the differences in political and historical contexts. New Zealand was not an aggressor in World War II, while Japan was, and Japan has a long history of war with its neighbors, which has been influential in its defense and foreign policies as well as disarmament diplomacy.

New Zealand's nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament efforts have been reflected in the policy area by passing the nuclear-free legislation in the 1980s. Since then, the nuclear-free policy has been supported in the form of an ongoing civil society and governmental relationship, which is lacking in Japan⁵. Why is New Zealand's societal model and policy pattern important for us? As mentioned earlier, one of the central contentions of this piece is that, in the case of New Zealand, the resources deployed and developed by civil society actors from the end of World War II to the 1980s helped to achieve their policy goals under favorable sociopolitical conditions. There is no doubt that it was germane to partisan politics, reflected in elections. The New Zealand political system is a representative parliamentary democracy whose western, liberal, and egalitarian values and ideologies have been proclaimed and embraced since the end of the colonial era. These values now continue under any sociopolitical circumstances.

According to the Sustainable Governance Indicator, with fair and transparent electoral policies and a strong rule of law, New Zealand, a liberal democracy with fully implemented and protected civil rights and trustworthy institutions, receives a high overall ranking for the quality of its democracy [42]. New Zealand has also been identified as one of the most peaceful countries in the world. According to the Global Peace Index 2018 and 2019, it is ranked the world's second most peaceful country [43]. Not surprisingly, the nation played a strong role in the UN nuclear ban treaty negotiations in 2017. New Zealand was one of the first states to ratify the TPNW.

Drivers of peace and nuclear-free mobilization in New Zealand are based on structural dynamism including internal capacities and resources, successful strategic calculations, coherence and design in

⁴ It deserves a note here that the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the U.S. and later 1986 Chernobyl Accident in the SSRs led to the intensification of the fear of nuclear weapons production and proliferation.

⁵ One of my interviewees, who has been a prominent peace activist, Ms. Laurie Ross, stated it clearly: The devastating effects of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima/Nagasaki were more relevant in relation to New Zealand people mobilizing the campaigns. The realization that a nuclear war could be over in a day, in which millions of people would die instantly, millions more would die slowly and most of the planet would be contaminated with radiation poisoning, motivated people with fear to prevent such an atrocity by marching in their millions in street protests. However, it was to no avail. No amount of education about the horrors of Hiroshima is sufficient to change political policies that support nuclear weapons "as defense/deterrence," even in Japan [18, 41].

timely actions, and rationalizing the nuclear-related risks and security challenges. The focus on the catastrophic image of radioactivity and nuclear arms race during the Cold War era, and the attribution of a moral value to the issue (such as on the civilian victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings), made sense to the general public. The majority of New Zealanders seemed (at least in the 1970s and 1980s) to understand the significance of their genuine role to be brave in the struggle to achieve the policy goal of a nuclear-free nation. Additionally, the parallel between the disarmament campaigns and the Labor Party's nuclear-free stance popularized and facilitated the fight against nuclear weapons, which gained recognition and eventually achieved legal status.

Politicians' effective and constant communication with the electorate paved the way for the electorate to access them regularly and at all times. Political sensitivity and value orientation resulted in active participation in elections. Participation rates in elections, in general, rarely dropped below 90% of eligible voters between the 1960s-1970s. Due to the national radio and television system and newspaper readership, which is among the highest in the world, the whole country was immediately responsive and reactive on local, national, and international issues [20].

A consistent collective engagement in the deliberative governance process and influencing the authorities for the common good can be a useful tool to have a win-win outcome. The basis for a mainstreamed anti-nuclear struggle was not only the energetic participation of many anti-nuclear or anti-war critics voicing their choices and opinions, but also a supportive party's affirmative reactions, as we see with the Labor Party in New Zealand's case. Legislative change can take place in democracies when a communicative approach (where citizens can easily access political elites) and collective persuasion on a contested issue that threaten their status quo is utilized.

Political elites and policymakers can play a significant role in protecting and strengthening spaces for citizens (the public sphere), which in return enables them to use their civic voices. This cannot be solely related to New Zealand's political history and government effectiveness, but also the way politicians approach the nuclear weapons issue as part of the peace and security issue within the rationalized and legitimized discourse. For New Zealanders, a general uniting factor was an unconditional opposition to nuclear weapons and a clear target toward their enemy (also nuclear weapons).

In the case of Japan, civil society groups and media outlets condemned the government for being inactive in the negotiations. Japan's failure to support the treaty has attracted criticism from numerous pro-disarmament groups and atomic bomb survivors, which discredited the government's long-standing anti-nuclear position. According to the recent survey conducted by the *Chugoku Shimbun*, 86% of *hibakusha* groups want Japan to take part in the meetings of the state parties of TPNW [44]. And yet, the LDP's policies are not reflective of public opinion on the disarmament issues and the support for global disarmament initiatives⁶. Even though anti-nuclear sentiment still prevails over strategic considerations, Japanese public opinion has not mobilized more actively for TPNW. It is also worth noting that recent research carried out by Baron et al. (2020) shows that approximately 75% of the Japanese public is in favor of signing and ratifying the TPNW [45]. We can assert that Japan's government ignores the majority's voice. Importantly, the main participants of the 2017 UN negotiations for the TPNW were only *hibakusha* and a handful of representatives of Japanese civil society organizations.

We see persistent public pressure and mobilization from civic actors in a limited and isolated manner in Japan's case. Nuclear-free forces with a peace orientation, including several spheres of society, have

⁶ For my doctoral research on environmental civil society mobilizing for energy policies in post-Fukushima Japan, most of my respondents from civil society organizations stated that the governmental representatives from the LDP continuously say, "I will take your opinions into consideration," or "It is a very important issue, and we will take care of it;" however, it does not lead to any substantial discussion or conclusion.

mobilized and taken actions themselves for a nuclear-free world in general, and against nuclear-weapon states in particular. Over the decades, organizational tools and resources (e.g. material and human resources) supported mobilization on peace and nuclear-free advocacy, the motivation and determination created by civil society actors, and the moral value added by pacifists and sensitive peacemakers. However, it was not sufficient to create a national identity as a nuclear-free nation, as seen in New Zealand. The Japanese government fails to provide more sustainable and morally-oriented defense strategies due to its reliance on the U.S. due to security diplomacy between both countries, existing nuclear threats from neighboring countries, and also isolated independent civic voices. Lessons for Japan and other countries which can be taken from the case of New Zealand are as follows: perseverance, consistency, and durability in policies; more communication and partnerships with civil society actors; further engagement of civic voices in sociopolitical issues; and active leadership on the TPNW.

It is also worth noting that New Zealand is one of the few developed nations that is not supportive of nuclear energy. According to New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), New Zealand relies largely on renewable alternatives in its energy portfolio, and it aims to achieve 100% renewable electricity by 2035 [46]. On the other hand, according to the 2018 Strategic Energy Plan, Japan's nuclear energy target for 2030 is at 20-22%, which increases Japan's reliance on nuclear energy [47]. This is contradictory to the views of the general population, as there has been a big shift in public opinion against nuclear energy following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident.

VI. Conclusion

The opposition toward nuclear weaponry in New Zealand that started after World War II solidified the links between the government and civil society, and continued advocacy led the nation to have a complete nuclear ban in 1987 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. The creation of New Zealand's identity as a nuclear-free nation was embraced and sustained over decades, and its global nuclear-free commitments can be seen as an important benchmark in peace and nuclear-free history. It proves what can be achieved when citizens unite and stand together for a nuclear-free nation. The successfully formulated and implemented policy outcome is based on the assessment of what could be done by civil society and what should be done by politicians.

For Japan, the dominant peace and nuclear-free discourses and activities are limited and are mainly carried out in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by *hibakusha* and their family members, who pass on war testimonies. That is to say, the anti-nuclear weapon lobby of Japan has limited power, which is mainly invisible outside Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There are several reasons for this: the long-standing security alliance with the U.S., the threats from nuclear-armed North Korea, and isolated civic mobilization. Living in these times is in itself political, and excluding public preferences and demands for signing the TPNW is critical. Despite widespread public support, Japan fails to take the lead in efforts by the national and international community to realize a world free of nuclear weapons.

Overall, the refusal to participate in the treaty discredits Japan's long-standing anti-nuclear position. Japan needs a mature and progressive democracy in which civil society can enjoy free discussions, including on nuclear weapons. We are aware that it may not be realistic for the time being; however, Japan needs to be more independent in its foreign policy discussions. Further efforts are needed to cultivate the democratic tools of civil society (social, educational, material, etc.) and political debates on its commitments to the realization of a nuclear-free world in a more open, patient, longstanding, and democratic manner. For this, New Zealand's example offers valuable lessons for Japan and other countries with its policy durability and legitimacy. This case tells us a historical story about the relationships between sociopolitical movements, civil society, and democratic institutions, affecting the visibility of peace and nuclear-free weapons campaigns in domestic and foreign policy agendas.

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