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Reviews

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REVIEWS

O'Reilley, Mary Rose. 1993. *The Peaceable Classroom*.
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Boynton/Cook.

Zoe Keithley

Question: What do a bill of rights for students, a spiritual handbook for teachers, a manifesto for liberal education, a searing analysis of the war mentality of twentieth century America, and the book *The Peaceable Classroom* have in common?

Answer: Mary Rose O'Reilley: Catholic, Buddhist, Quaker, pacifist, professor of English at St. Thomas University in St. Paul, Minnesota.

Mary Rose O'Reilley harnesses the teaching of literature directly to a political position of pacifism, joining ranks with a select group often labeled educational mavericks—Ivan Illich, Ira Shor come to mind—who have pursued their passionate conviction that education should aggressively further the well-being of students, teachers, and community.

O'Reilley explains how she became yoked to the question, "Is it possible to teach English so that people stop killing each other?" (p. 20) proposed by a mentor some twenty years ago in graduate school—a question so surprising as to qualify as a koan.

The Peaceable Classroom sets forth an argument for the coming to the academy of what Martin Luther King, Jr. called "beloved community" (p. xvii). It uses an unorthodox, collage-like form that not only offers readers hands-on participation in the author's own process, but mirrors the way a class or course, under a pedagogy of peaceful teaching and learning, might appear and proceed.

Look at this partial table of contents: Inner Peace Studies and the World of the Writing Teacher; "Exterminate the Brutes" and Other Notes Toward a Spirituality of Teaching; Silence and Slow time; The Retro War; The Sibyl in the Bottle. We are swimming in spirituality and poetry, in personal reflection, surprising opposites.

Listen to Peter Elbow, the Lewis-and-Clark of Voice, in the Foreword: "[T]his book constructs a wide-ranging exploration of teaching derived from her focus on *peaceableness* or *nonviolence*" (p. ix). "There is anything but easy optimism here.... But she gives courage about *having* the vision and letting teaching grow out of it....respecting the inner struggle and disappointment as part of the real life of a teacher" (p. xiii).

The book begins with the "pedagogy of the depressed" drawn from O'Reilley's experiences with Special Learning/Behavior Disordered (SLBD) students at what she names the Black Hole School. The trip is not linear but

rather one "of stories, tropes, and images that nudge up against each other" (p. xvii), moving quietly among the years of formation and rumination, arriving at tentative positions, reaching forward. An uneven pedagogy of peace unfolds itself through an unexpected authorial intimacy. We see where academic concerns necessarily meet the roots of humanity, whether we like it or not.

"I wondered if we can discover the seeds of war in the interactions of the typical classroom or wherever our treasures happen to lie" (p. 22). O'Reilley introduces the systemic evidence of war in academia, its pervasiveness in policies and practices, in administration, in our teaching, and in our students' ingrained attitudes and expectations.

But O'Reilley also reveals to us that counter-balancing light at the very heart of our studies, the awakening and energizing of our spiritual life. "This act of 'entering in' and the transformations of consciousness that accompany it is the essential moral transaction of the literature of the classroom," O'Reilley tells us (p. 26). On these grounds she calls the teaching of literature a radical act. "I try each Monday to set up utopian communities of reflection, acceptance, and useful work" (p. 28). "We know...little about cooperation; more about the male than the female; the outer world than the inner; the rational than the intuitive; the machine than the garden" (pp. 34-35). She brings to her students a syllabus of listening to the texts. She stopped lecturing, she says, so that her students could hear each other, and the literature, and her.

O'Reilley goads—herself and us—into the radical change of peaceableness in the classroom, in all of academic life. "The arrangement of our classrooms should tell us, if we do not consciously know, what horizon we have set for the next generation" (p. 40).

She points out solid beginnings already made. "By incorporating such strategies as group process and freewriting, by defining the concept of voice... Macrorie, Elbow and their colleagues were laying out, I believe, a pedagogy of nonviolence" (pp. 38-39). She speaks of our work as teachers as being one of helping students to find a "sacred center," that place at the crossroads of human experience, beyond that, to point out the wider circle of community within which each exists. "To find voice and to mediate voice in a circle of others is one of the central dialectics of the peaceable classroom," O'Reilley holds (p.40).

The English classroom, she contends, is one place whose actual business is to help students access their spirits, their personal voices, as well as the voices of others. The finding of voice, O'Reilley holds to be a spiritual event of major proportion.

O'Reilley acknowledges *The Peaceable Classroom* is a compilation of previously published articles yoked to fresh material. This may explain a certain unevenness in the book: distinct changes in respiration, stylistic quarrels, a sense of patchwork. It might explain some overblown treatments, or the giving of depth but no breadth to a subject which the form of the book cannot accommodate adequately. The treatment of "maleness" and the roots of anti-feminism come to mind, an *opus maximus* in itself, let alone applied to the academy, or to the English classroom and its relationship to peace.

But whether you teach at a university or in a public school, if you don't demand a perfect ride, and if your taste runs to astute observation, to books which

are frank and funny, rich in personal anecdote and literary attribution, from an author widely and deeply read in the humanities who integrates what she reads and practices what she preaches, you will want the adventuring, the mentoring, the friendship of *The Peaceable Classroom*. ☺

Brand, Alice G., and Richard L. Graves, Eds. 1994.
Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive.
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Boynton/Cook.

Gerd Bräuer

Back in Germany I often thought about how to change the common way of introducing students to literature by just reading and discussing it from the teacher's point of view. As the years went by, I favored the link between storytelling, theater improvisation, and writing, believing in the necessity of interweaving the wisdom of the literary text with students' own experiences. What else can make learning more important than seeing knowledge in its deep connections to one's own life?

Departing from there and starting research on American writing pedagogy in 1992, I naturally came across works by Janet Emig, Peter Elbow, James Moffett, Gabriele Rico, and others. By reading books such as Elbow's *Writing Without Teachers* (1973) and *Writing With Power* (1981), Moffett's *Active Voice* (1981), and Emig's *The Web of Meaning* (1977), later on Rico's *Pain and Possibilities* (1991) and again Moffett with *Coming on Center: English Education in Evolution* (1981)—especially his essays on writing and meditation—I finally introduced myself to *Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi* (1969), *Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension: Symbolic Form in the Rhetoric of Silence* (1993) by George Kalamaras, and *Free Play: Improvisation in Life and Art* (1990) by Stephen Nachmanovitch. As I listened to Janet Emig at the 1993 NCTE Conference on Teaching English and the Language Arts in Portland, Oregon, honoring James Moffett's influence on English education, I finally found what I was searching for in my analysis of writing curricula in American grade schools, colleges, and universities: the teaching of writing as a tool for individual and institutional growth toward creative and collaborative learning.

When I talked to Moffett about my research, he mentioned a new book, *Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive*, edited by Alice Brand and Richard Graves, quite worth reading, but not just for academic purposes, Moffett said. I got the book the same day, started reading it and soon after I knew this book was a most valuable discovery for my work. Later, after I had already put some of the teaching and writing methods from the book into practice—first just by myself, later with my classes—I began to realize the value of

the book for my personal growth.

Through *Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive* (1994) I started to understand the complexity of the term, “writing as a mode of learning,” which here goes much further than Janet Emig’s initial definition in the essay of the same name (*The Web of Meaning*, 1983). Such learning is no longer limited merely to the conscious, but reaches “beyond the cognitive,” as the subtitle of the book signals. What that exactly means is not easily said in a few words. In one of the first meetings of the interest group “Beyond the Cognitive Domain,” the participants came up with 34 different terms (p. 1) for defining their area of attention, all heading somehow in a similar direction but no two of them having precisely the same meaning. I would like to focus on just three terms—writing and learning through *silence*, writing and *intuitive learning*, and writing and *therapeutic learning*—giving examples of how I have read the book and in what ways it has influenced me.

From time to time I get into an argument with my daughter. After a while our voices rise, joined by sharply gesticulating hands. I can almost see the air burning between us. When, in such moments, I step off the stage of overheated verbal combat, take my daughter’s head, and gently bury it under my arms, all of a sudden, I feel silence physically. It takes away pressure from both forehead and neck, clears my sight, and frees my chest of a heavy weight. I am now able to breath again.

When I was in a conflict with myself, wanting to write better, faster, more, I used to think writing comes through writing—a consideration which, I still believe, is not wrong, but one which does not always work. Silence (Part One of the book)—waiting, meditating, recentering myself—is another way of overcoming obstacles to a harmonious flow of human communication, whether it be on paper between my own voices, in the classroom between me and my students, or at home between my daughter and me. Peter Elbow’s restructuring of silence (p. 9), Donald Gallehr’s demand to “wait, and the writing will come” (p. 21), and Charles Suhor’s “pedagogy of silence” (p. 31) have helped me to discover the creative impact of the moments before, between, and after the act of writing.

Elbow writes: “I have a hunger for silence” and “In fact I’ve always been interested in people who don’t write or talk—the silent ones” (p. 10). In his collage he looks for a relationship between silence and voices, the ones in us and around us. What do they sound like in silence? He is concerned about what happens in the writer’s body when there is no writing. Are we able bodily to feel the energy of the voices we deal with? Does the meaning-making of something we wrote or wanted to write about stop? What response do we get from our felt sense about our writing process?

Years ago in a class on German poetry, I got stuck trying to get students to interpret a text. They didn’t see anything other than heavy, blurry metaphors in the poem and by complaining about the “stupidity” of the text they successfully aggravated the frustration. “What happens in the text?” I shouted over their ducked heads, frustrated myself, and without thinking about what I was actually saying. I promptly received a response telling me clearly that the subject of the discussion was poetry, not prose or drama, and, therefore, nobody understood me asking about the story line. I called myself stupid, impulsive, and incapable of

consistent thinking in literary genres. I was about to excuse myself to rearrange my material, when suddenly a young woman stood up and ambled across the classroom, transforming the heavy, blurry poetical metaphors into a light, transparent movement of a short improvisation. What we weren't able to see on paper by thinking in theoretical terms became instantly visible and emotionally understandable by the woman's physical performance.

Being under pressure and not thinking any longer about the boundaries between literary genres, I intuitively grasped for help by asking them to identify the dramatic action in the text from my most abiding interest—*theater*. Nevertheless, the step “from intuition to insight” (p. 67)—I want to call it here *intuitive learning*—was also taken by the young woman and, later on, by the students, who for the rest of the class, enthusiastically told me personal stories related to the subject of our initially so-badly-handled poem.

Wisdom of the Unconscious (Part Two) and Wisdom of the Body (Part Three), make up, to my understanding, the backbone of the book. The essays provided me insights into the psychic and physical links between intellect and emotion in the process of writing and learning. The authors, Anne Mullin, Richard Graves and Susan Becker, Elizabeth Holman, Sondra Perl, Karen Klein and Linda Hecker, and Trudelle Thomas make visible processes which we all experience every day, without, unfortunately, being aware of them: an intuitive learning, a learning through our senses. “The unconscious speaks in many voices,” so the introduction to Part Two refers one more time to Part One and its statements about silent voices. Here the voices come as traces in writing which lead and link to unconscious parts of our memories (pp. 41–52), or as personal metaphors, mysteries, and memories, deeply connected to the inexhaustible unconscious of the writer (pp. 53–64). In the book our inner voices are also shown as physically present: as felt sense (pp. 73–88), spatial kinesthetic (pp. 89–98), and acoustic sense (pp. 99–112). They enrich our writing when we are able to notice and understand their messages within a process of intuitive learning.

By working with Sondra Perl's guidelines for composing, my class and I followed the “writer's way of knowing” (p. 77). I taught Perl's model in contrast to a German program by Gert Ueding, a current-traditional rhetorician from the University in Tübingen. In his book, *Rhetorik des Schreibens* (Meisenheim: Verlag Anton, 1991), Ueding introduces a model where writing is understood as a tool for describing reality objectively. Ueding proposes step-by-step programs for writing in different nonfictional genres. One of his major concerns is “controlled writing” (p. 20), that is, tailoring one's exact language use to the rhetorical situation and audience. The central method Ueding relies on is *imitatio* (Cicero and Quintilian), the imitation of recognized authors through extensive reading and writing.

Here are a few statements about the differences my students experienced throughout the writing process: “With Perl I was concentrating on what I wanted to write after a few minutes”; “Confronted with Ueding's rule-canon I felt as if I were becoming smaller and smaller”; “When we did the breathing, it connected my thoughts and emotions”; “With Ueding I felt very comfortable and safe, because the stuff I was writing about didn't really belong to me. I just documented it”; “By reflecting on my own writing process as well as my feelings and thoughts,

writing for the first time became personally important"; "Ueding's model is good for class: clear structure and academic value. Perl's model is good for a therapy session: It opens up a lot you can't easily stop after the class is over."

Writing as *therapeutic learning*? While Ueding's model embodies strict rhetorical patterns to be followed for the purpose of correct writing by fulfilling stylistic rules, Perl's approach is directed toward the inner self of the writer. Hers are guidelines for an active, individual search for one's own voice as a human being. Understanding the history of rhetoric and its results as an institution, Ueding's writing becomes institutional, public, even though it might be intended for private use. Perl's writing is personal, though it would seem to aim for a larger audience. To my understanding, education needs to combine both ways, writing and learning within and beyond the cognitive, so that they may go hand in hand.

The essays by Hildy Miller, Kristie Fleckenstein, and Demetrice Worley in Part Four of the book, entitled *Images*, reminded me of Janet Emig's 1983 essay, "Hand, Eye, Brain: Some 'Basics' in the Writing Process" (*The Web of Meaning*), in which she quotes Jean-Paul Sartre describing his vision loss as the end of his career as a writer. Emig at that time searched for answers of how the eye participates in the writing process, focusing on the cognitive effort of the eye. The authors of Part Four of this book concentrate on the intuitive, the invisible of the visible like part one was on the silent voices: It is the recognition of images as something which fosters writing that interests Miller. For Fleckenstein it is the interplay between image and emotion that is a key for creating texts successfully. Worley bridges the gap between cognition and intuition: She suggests exercises for improving the ability to visualize for effective detail—writing and problem-solving.

Coming from a rather rationally oriented German culture and education, I found that the essays by Brand and Teich on Emotions (Part Five) in the writing classroom were beneficial to my understanding of the theoretical and practical connection between intuition and cognition. In these essays, sensual experience is characterized as important in the process of unfolding personality and establishing a system of human values within society. Learning through writing "beyond the cognitive domain" is described as a matter of individual *and* of social learning. Living as I do in a society that overrates science and technology, I found Alice Brand's conclusion about the system of human values personally exciting: "The most important human values are emotional, not intellectual" (p. 178). Unfortunately, I cannot claim to have already learned how to live this wisdom. To know something and to be able to put it into practice are two different shoes. Writing about this conflict might be a chance to get used to the new shoe.

The Open Door (Part Six) led me to the historical dimension of writing: narrating, searching, recalling, listening, viewing, and imagining. The process of composing integrates past, present, and future, even though we as writers might sometimes not be aware of it. Our autobiography is part of history; our daily life stories embody the present; hopes, dreams, and fears are our vision of the future. To discover their often hidden richness, it needs techniques tapping into the unconscious: Donald Murray introduces story writing as writing personal history;

personal writing as healing is the focus by Sandra Burkett and Gabriele Rico; Richard Murphy Jr. recounts the relationships between teacher and student needed to hold open the door toward our past, present, and future.

The progression of the parts in *Presence of Mind*, evocative of the movement of one's personal growth, almost persuades me to believe in the existence of a "right way" to reach the root of creativity: Silence, Wisdom of the Unconscious, Wisdom of the Body, Images, Emotions, and The Open Door. Nevertheless, no single essay within the parts listed above made me feel able to count on anything more than myself. To believe in oneself (as a writer) here means to trust oneself as a whole person: one's body, experience, and language. From there one can go on as far as one wishes. "What a miracle," Peter Elbow exclaims, "we can write anything...we can say anything. Language doesn't fail" (p. 9). For the different paths of this journey the articles do not provide recipes, but rather suggestions, examples, experience, tips for remembering—all in all, a space for personal growth. ☺

Humphrey, Nicholas, 1992. *A History of the Mind: Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Larry Anderson

Nicholas Humphrey sets no small task for himself; he states boldly in his preface that this book is "an evolutionary history of how sensory consciousness has come into the world and what it is doing there....It sets out not just to define the problem of consciousness but to solve it" (p. 17). Humphrey succeeds by the end of book in solving a theoretical problem. But what we are unaware of at the start is that he will continually narrow the scope of his key terms, so that by the end we are not sure that what he has solved is the problem of consciousness. I think of someone who is about to explain the internal combustion engine, but ends up actually just explaining the carburetor because in the process he defines the carburetor as the place where it all begins. We certainly learn something about the internal combustion engine, but not exactly what we at first thought we would.

The most fascinating part of the book is its overview of evolutionary history from the origin of the cosmos to the present. Humphrey is careful to begin at the beginning, imagining the time when there were no sentient creatures and how they—our ancestors—came to be. He takes the long view to avoid making any assumptions about either the emergence of mind and consciousness or about objective physical reality. He spends a little time criticizing other theorists for making just such assumptions but quickly moves into evolution. As organisms developed, their membranes became increasingly important in that they eventually created the distinction between "me" and "not-me." These boundaries, though, were also frontiers at which the outside world made an impact on the organism.

Over time there would have developed (so Humphrey's argument goes) organisms that could select among various influences those that were "good" and those that were "bad"; these were early sensations. As the sensitivity of this frontier increased, the organism could make progressively selective and specific responses. This brings us to Humphrey's definition of mind: the faculty of organisms that stored "action-based representations of the effects of environmental stimulation on their own bodies" (p. 42). That is, the stimulation that evoked an action has become meaningful; the mind developed in response to the "phenomenology of sensory experiences" (p. 42). Due to these representations we have a clear distinction between "that which is happening to me" and "that which is happening out there."

In this distinction we have the difference between sensation and perception; for Humphrey, the distinction rests on the act of interpretation. For instance, organisms during the first stage of evolution constantly processed input through their sense organs, which allowed them to create a subjective presence. But in order to create "intentional objects of cognition and objective knowledge of the external world" (p. 44), a new style of processing had to evolve, a style that depended on the organism interpreting the sensation as representing something "out there." As an illustration, Humphrey describes a scene in which he is sitting at his desk writing. He is being bombarded by stimuli: approaching thunder, sights and smells from the garden outside the window, an ant crawling up his leg. At one level, he processes these stimuli as sensations that affect his private world; he likes some and dislikes others. But at another level, he interprets these stimuli as signs that signify the state of the external world. "At the second level," Humphrey states, "I am the spectator of a public world (not my world now) of independent physical phenomena" (p. 45).

With this phenomenological background, Humphrey illustrates the nature of sensory experience using the sense of smell, drawing on Thomas Reid's *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785). With Reid's help, he points out that when we smell a rose, sensation answers the question "What is happening to me?" Perception answers the question, "What is happening out there?" The crucial determination to be made is whether sensation and perception exist in a serial or parallel relationship. He goes on to argue, convincingly, that the relationship is a parallel one. But he first bemoans the nineteenth century's obsession with perception to the exclusion of sensation, the effects of which we feel to this day. In the process he applauds the Romantic poets (Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron) and the Impressionistic painters (Van Gogh, Monet) for turning away from perception and focusing on sensation.

He returns to his argument, then, by pointing out that if he can show that it's possible to "decouple" sensation and perception, then that would tell us if they were serial or parallel. He accomplishes this by drawing on experimental and clinical evidence as well as thought experiments based on questions like, "What would happen if you could wear glasses that reversed all colors?" and "What would happen if you could wear glasses that inverted everything?" Having arrived at this juncture, we seem poised on the brink of reaching Humphrey's definition of the term "consciousness." But he isn't ready to deliver yet.

He anticipates potential criticism of his argument at this point on the basis

of imagery. He recognizes that we can create images of sensations (visual ones being the easiest), which pose a problem for his theory: How do we know if a sensation is actual or imagined? He provides an answer to this question. But it rests squarely on evolutionary history.

Having addressed this potential criticism, he defines what it means to be conscious: "to have affect-laden mental representations of something happening here and now to me" (p. 120). He immediately recognizes the narrowness of this definition, for it says nothing about other states of mind that we obviously have but that also obviously do not arise from the stimulation of our sense organs. This narrows his territory considerably; in effect, he removes the concept of consciousness from discussions of cognition. He apparently feels that the latter has been explored all too thoroughly by those psychologists who have focused on perception. Humphrey separates perception from sensation, having shown their relationship to be parallel rather than serial. So what we end up with is a theory of sensations, with an argument for the centrality of affect in our lives—our subjectivities—since sensations are affect-laden. In other words, Humphrey revises Descartes dictum: "*I feel*, therefore I am" (p. 115).

At this point, his argument takes a bold turn. If we agree that sensations require some state of control over the responses evoked by outside stimulation, then perhaps it is we who control our sensations. Humphrey proposes that we are the authors of the sensations we typically believe "happen to" us. In order to argue this, he claims that the "I" experiences two different durations of time, which he calls physical and subjective. For example, imagine persons climbing a spiral staircase. As they climb, they naturally feel that they are continually advancing; yet on a spiral staircase half the time they are actually retreating. For Humphrey, a unit of physical time (the time needed to reach the top of the staircase) contains an entire sequence of units of subjective time (the time needed to raise one foot and place it on the next tread). Consequently, "what constitutes the conscious present is largely the immediate sensory *afterglow* of stimuli that have just passed by—the dying-away activity in reverberating sensory loops" (p. 189). It is from the reverberating loop that Humphrey claims we actually send outward the instructions for the sensations we want. He summarizes it: "What it is for someone to feel a particular sensation is just for him to issue whatever 'instructions' are required to bring about the appropriate activity" (p. 192). The weakness in this argument is Humphrey's assumption of such a thing as physical times, as opposed to subjective time. It could be argued that all time is subjective time because time is always processed mentally.

And so we arrive at the solution he promised to the "problem of consciousness" (p. 17). In his preface he warned us to not expect too much: "Could the solution to the problem of consciousness be boring?" He returns to this question at the end, defending the critique I made earlier about narrowing the scope of what we take to be the original topic. After all, Humphrey seems to imply, 'the problem is not as complicated as we all thought! Of course, the way he has framed the problem, the answer is a bit boring, not for what he says but for what he does not say. He knows he is leaving some readers dissatisfied. Mmmm. But he finds he can't stop there; he concludes with a two-page final chapter which may be summarized in one sentence: "It is consciousness [as he, of course, has defined

it], with its power to make the vanishing instant of physical time live on as the felt movement of sensation, that makes it LIKE SOMETHING TO BE OURSELVES—and so sweetens and enriches the being of the external world FOR US” (p. 228). I, for one, find myself not persuaded.

Humphrey presents his ideas in a readable, almost folksy style. He does a convincing job of redirecting our attention to the importance of sensations and makes a strong case for the parallel existence of sensation and perception. But with the focus on sensation, I was puzzled by the complete inattention paid to research on sensory-deprivation. Likewise, he makes no reference to Julian Jaynes’ *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* (1976) or Gerald Edelman’s *Bright, Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind* (1992), which would seem to have some natural points of overlap. ■

Hughes, Elaine Farris. 1994. *Writing from the Inner Self*. New York: HarperCollins.

Debora F. Van Hoorn

Writing from the Inner Self provides both teachers and students with 48 writing exercises and nearly 300 writing ideas designed to foster self-awareness through self-examination. Elaine Farris Hughes claims these writing and meditation activities will free students’ creativity, inspire their imagination, and help them overcome writer’s block. The book is designed so that students can use it on their own and the instructors can choose their own level of involvement. Each of the exercises employs some type of inner focus, meditation (meditation is used here as a catch-all phrase for a variety of inner-focusing techniques, including conscious breathing, visualization, sensory awareness, guided imagery, and memory recall), encouraging readers to look inside themselves first and discover personal connections with the subject before they even begin to write. Hughes, retired from Nassau Community College in New York City, developed these exercises as a way to generate in-class journal entries. Many of these ideas were first published in 1991 in a trade book for the general public. Hughes revised and expanded that book of 63 exercises into this text for college students. An instructor’s guide is also available.

The exercises are arranged into three sections with each of the twelve chapters containing four exercises. The exercises are grouped in such a way as to lead writers progressively deeper into themselves and into their writing. While the starting point is the physical body, the exercises quickly lead into the broader, more abstract realms of feelings, memories, self-awareness, observations, events, and imagination. Each exercise contains some form of meditation, introspection, body awareness, observation, or a reliving of past events.

Part One, The Inner World, contains twenty exercises on The Body (e.g., Recapture a feeling of yourself as an infant), Childhood Memories (Remember your first love), Intense Emotions (Contemplate an incident of early rejection), Memorable Moments (Remember a moment of rebellion), and Observing Your Life (Think about your life in relation to popular songs).

Part Two, The Outer World, contains sixteen exercises on Seeing (Objectively examine a kitchen utensil), People (Observe people in a public place), Places (Explore your ideas of home), and Events (Think about a modern hero).

Part Three, The World of Invention, contains twelve exercises on Reading (Bring a character from literature to life in your mind), Mind Play (Imagine you wake up to find you've changed sex overnight), and Imagination (Relive a nightmare you've had).

Part Four of the text is a handbook of sorts, covering among others such concepts as voice, audience, and revision. Here Hughes guides students in molding their freewriting into an essay, using the multiple drafts of prologue as an example. The book closes with an appendix of sources and some sample student writings that correlate to exercises given in the text.

Hughes, acknowledging the often difficult task of writing, encourages and explains a traditional method of process writing that "requires *all* your resources—mental alertness, imagination, emotional response, a relationship with chaos, physical stamina, and the courage to face the critics who will read what you have written" (p. 3). The exercises presented in this text are easy to follow intellectually; however, the number and types of questions may prove a bit overwhelming emotionally to some students. While this text could prove interesting in the classroom, the instructor must be prepared to deal with students' innermost thoughts, sometimes frightening and messy, which result from this type of assignment. The Inner World section causes some concern. Several of the writing exercises might prompt some deep levels of sharing best handled by a trained counselor. Consider the following suggested writing assignments and the manner in which some students might respond:

- Write a personal essay about all the major scars you have acquired (physical, psychological, or emotional) (pp. 34–36).
- Write a short essay that details an early rejection and explain how this experience has affected your concept of yourself and your life (pp. 63–65).
- Write out your full confession of an incident that continues to cause you shame, guilt, or embarrassment (pp. 66–68).
- Recall an incident in which you felt intense anger. Stay in touch with the anger until it begins to dissolve. Don't turn away from it or talk yourself out of it. Give up your anger only when you're ready (pp. 68–70).

Hughes gives little advice, and there has been little written on what the instructor should do with such self-disclosure. Marti Singer's 1990 article "Responding to Intimacies and Crises in Students' Journals" (*English Journal*, 79) addresses the issue of self-disclosure in the composition classroom. When Singer received some personal revelation via a student's writing, she was "flattered and awed by the trust and confidence displayed through long detailed

accounts of students' lives and experiences" (p. 72). However, she then wondered how to respond to such sharing and sought out answers in composition theory. She found that "there is very little written about ways of responding to...personal writing" (p. 73). While other articles and books deal tangentially with the issue of self-disclosure, there is a gap—no, more of a gaping hole—in the research in this area. Until such research is undertaken, the following books may help clarify the instructor's and the student's role in a classroom where personal writing occurs: *Inside Out: A Guide to Writing* by Maurice Scharton and Janice Neuleib (1993), *The Hero Within* by Carol S. Pearson (1989), *Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive*, edited by Alice G. Brand and Richard L. Graves (1994), and *Coming on Center* by James Moffett (1981). Overall, Hughes' textbook could be a catalyst for some wonderful expressive writing. However, be prepared to deal with the ensuing writing which may be uncomfortably personal. ☹️

Kalamaras, George. 1994. *Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension: Symbolic Form in the Rhetoric of Silence*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Susan Becker

This slim volume is a short course in both quantum physics and the humanities: philosophy, religion, music, and literature. Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Levi-Strauss, Keats, Coleridge, Eliot, and Pirsig all play a role in developing the author's argument that silence is a mode of knowing.

Kalamaras opens with a reference to the Eastern mystic Rumi who stated that we know each other in unspoken ways. Nevertheless, notes the author, "As a practitioner of silence, I have sometimes felt at odds with the intellectual and academic community" because in the West silence is often cast as the "bad guy" (p. xi). The argument for promoting silence that follows is logical, informing, and engaging. Kalamaras shows reader awareness by using the first person "I" to personalize sometimes convoluted thinking, allowing the reader to share not only in the author's mental process but also in his conclusion: Practitioners of silence no longer need to keep silent because silence is a demonstrable mode of knowing.

To support this thesis, the author provides seven chapters replete with endnotes and a glossary of thirty terms from Eastern philosophy and religion. The one hundred and thirty works consulted identify AEPL scholars and charter members James Moffett and Charles Suhor alongside Jung, Suzuki, Eckhart, Shakespeare, Bakhtin, Britton, Elbow, Vygotsky, and others.

With the definition that silence is an emptiness that is full, Chapter One, "Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension," sets up the argument that silence is a mode of knowing. The culprit for silence as emptiness, claims Kalamaras, is Western rational thought. By associating power with language (i.e., discourse as enfranchisement), it follows that silence or lack of discourse is annihilation. Mistrust of silence in the West is the result of Plato's classical view reinforced by Aristotle, objectivism, feminism, and poststructuralism (p. 9).

But Eastern philosophy cultivates paradox by locating reciprocity in opposites. Contrary to the dualistic Western view of language and silence as opposites, these dualisms construct knowledge in reciprocal fashion. Meaning need not be dependent on language in oral or written form. If rhetoric is defined as a symbolic act that makes meaning, then silence is a rhetoric.

Kalamaras personalizes his thesis in the second chapter before investigating theory, poetics, and the symbolic complexity in later chapters. Chapter Two, "Into the Chaos: Writing Across the Curriculum and the Tao of Change" answers the question: What role does the teacher of process writing play in writing across the curriculum? Kalamaras uses James Moffett's and Charles Suhor's emphasis on the reciprocity of silence and meaning to investigate theories of composing and curriculum development as shaped by intuition, ambiguity, tenuousness, and chaos. Ever present is the paradox of chaos and order. Comparing his position as writing consultant in the biology department to a zebra fish in an aquarium of leeches, Kalamaras explains that he survived the challenging consultancy not by trying to overcome contradictions but by immersing himself in them. Talking and listening (i.e., collaborating and reciprocating) led to a synthesis of discourse with silence, separate with connected knowing. When the language of the consultant and the language of the biology faculty actually inhabited each other, the two sides arrived at a condition of mutual understanding and eventual success in what had appeared to be a doomed consulting assignment across the curriculum.

Chapters Three and Four provide the meaty center of the book. "Classical Rhetoric, Objectivism, Mysticism, and the Great Divide" examines the ways classical rhetorical theory, objectivism, and Western mysticism have fostered a mistrust of silence. Starting with the Gospel According to John and moving backward and forward thorough times and places, Kalamaras traces the relationship between words and origins via Plato's *Phaedrus*, Aristotle's development of Plato's binary vision, and Cartesian perceptions. The author then examines Eastern modes of thought that allow a less dichotomous and more fluid approach. Jung and Eckhart, Western thinkers who have examined Eastern modes, authenticate the "vacuum-plenum" paradox as a legitimate merging of words into silence as in "OM" (p. 90). Britton and Polanyi have, in turn, enlarged this interpretive framework, showing that individual utterances do contribute to meaning. Nevertheless, the presence of a fixed categorical reality in Western thought makes it difficult for Westerners to accept as valid the complex ambiguity of mystical experience and practice necessary to the language/silence paradox.

As Chapter Four posits, although our culture fosters the binary thinking so antithetical to silence, Western art relies on the nonconceptual as a way of making meaning. "Paradox and the Sacred: The Still Point of the Turning World" uses poetics to validate movement and stillness, word and silence. Sound devices

and metaphor have been used by such poets as Shakespeare, Shelley, Keats, Blake, and Eliot to expand the perception of reality by altering time and emotion. Their successors in projectivist (open form) verse and talk poetry have added tricks of typography for short-circuiting the categorical to focus on symbolic form. Language and its gaps reciprocally create meaning. Kalamaras recalls an early awareness to “both the harmony *and* the melody, the stillness *and* the dance” (p. 144). Their method is not unlike the Zen koan or nonsensical statement designed to prepare the mind for a nonverbal experience of reality.

The three final chapters are “An Intimate Immensity: Silence and the Paradox of Attention”; “The Physics of Meditation: Silence and the Garland of Letters”; and “The Death of the Self: Poststructuralism and a Rhetoric of Silence.” Together they round out Kalamaras’ argument that silence is not transcendental. The quantum model reveals silence as generative, a symbolic act that makes meaning and is therefore a rhetoric compatible with dialogic theories of composing. The following are highlights of the author’s argument:

- Yoga or “union” is a practice that leads to oneness of mind and body, stillness in movement, the “zero” experience. This paradox is generative.
- According to Gaston Bachelard, the paradox of knowing is not knowing: “Behind dark curtains, snow seems to be whiter” (p. 153). The apparent contradiction is reciprocal.
- Ralph Waldo Emerson dissolves dualities with awareness of “the wise silence” when within man lies “the soul of the whole” (p. 156).
- T.S. Eliot writes a corollary for silence and language when he says, “at the still point, there the dance is” (p. 160).
- The mantra, “OM,” reveals that silence is constituted of sound, and the word constitutes and dissolves itself endlessly.
- Awareness of silence is a symbolic form of interpretation that makes meaning as does any rhetoric.
- Quantum physics via vacuum diagrams verifies that empty space is not empty (the vacuum-plenum).
- Since reality is not a stable, definable condition but is shaped through acts of perception, nonconceptual understanding itself is a symbolic form that makes meaning.
- Silence retains the potential of language by expanding the complexity of language into “its ‘original way’ or ‘radical vital potential’ from which all form manifests” (p. 196).
- Maurice Blanchot’s concept of the paradox of life and death simultaneously decenters and reconstitutes the self in symbolic form.

Thus, concludes Kalamaras, if both quantum physics and deconstructionist theory suggest that symbolic forms construct knowledge and silence has been shown to be such a form, *then silence is a way of knowing that makes meaning*. With bold erudition and much documentation, the author comes full circle to vali-

date the paradox of discourse and its void, silence, as a valid methodology in the teaching and learning of writing.

This landmark little book is a volume of the SUNY series, Literacy, Culture, and Learning: Theory and Practice, with Alan C. Purves as editor. George Kalamaras, a writing professor at Indiana University-Purdue University and a recent recipient of a poetry fellowship from the National Endowment of the Arts, was present at the AEPL session on silence during the Conference on College Composition and Communication 1994 in Nashville. From the cover of his book, which features an attractive pen and ink rendering named "Yogi," to the detailed index at its conclusion, Kalamaras takes readers on an intellectual journey through Eastern and Western culture. His challenging argument is a viable contribution to knowledge on the affective domain to which AEPL is dedicated. ☺