Indeterminism in Kane’s Event-Causal Libertarianism

Abstract

In this paper, I examine the plausibility of event-causal libertarianism, a prominent view on free will which regards indeterminism in the causal history of a decision as necessary for an agent’s moral responsibility for a subsequent action. Specifically, I investigate how Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarian account fares in light of Derk Pereboom’s powerful “disappearing agent” objection, in addition to criticisms of my own. Kane concludes that Pereboom’s objection is ineffective against his account. I argue against Kane’s conclusion by highlighting a dilemma which results from Kane's response to the disappearing agent objection; either way Kane’s position is interpreted, his account is unsuccessful.

Keywords:

• Free Will Keyword: Free Will
• indeterminism Keyword: indeterminism
• Kane Keyword: Kane
• Pereboom Keyword: Pereboom
• action Keyword: action
• decision Keyword: decision
• event-causal libertarianism Keyword: event-causal libertarianism
• determinism Keyword: determinism
• disappearing agent Keyword: disappearing agent
• moral responsibility Keyword: moral responsibility
• plural voluntary control Keyword: plural voluntary control

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